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The linguistic structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) attracted the 
attention of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, prompting what is thought to be Merleau-Ponty’s 
“linguistic turn” of 1947.  Saussure’s theory of the self-referential structure of linguistic 
signs as constitutive of value, was tied by Merleau-Ponty to his conception of the structure 
of intercommunication as constitutive of human value and meaning.  Jacques Derrida, in 
the 1960s, also appealed to Saussure’s theory in formulating his thesis of a deferring and 
differing relationship between linguistic signs as constitutive of meaning, but rejected what 
he saw as the privileging of a metaphysics of presence-to-meaning in Saussure.   
One set of questions raised here concerns the relationship between thought and 
perception and calls for a reevaluation of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of 
perception in light of his final, posthumously published work.  The possibility of a full 
philosophical dialectic between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida was rendered impossible by 
Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death.  In the interest of such a dialogue, this study addresses the 
similarities and dissimilarities in their positions regarding language and meaning within a  
central theme of: truth.  An area of concern is how their views come to bear upon the 
ongoing debate between subjectivist and objectivist theories of meaning.  Can we arrive at  
an authentic understanding and expression of truth and meaning?  Getting there entails an  
 
iv 
understanding of the formal structure of language and its role in the genesis of linguistic 
meaning. 
This study treats the subject of the origins of language and meaning in terms of a 
phenomenological approach which places all origin squarely in the lived-world of 
experience.  If we agree that our very being is constituted by and in an immersion and 
interaction in the world, this will suggest that meaning is posited by consciousness in a 
process of repetition in which thought serves to confirm an initial pre-reflective perception.  
Merleau-Ponty’s interwoven flesh of the world and Derrida’s interwoven textuality are 
proposed as alternatives to tradition's reliance upon external referents in intellectualism and 



























 The general topic to be explored in this study is the role of language in the formation 
and expression of our thoughts and meanings.  Its focus will be to articulate Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis upon pre-reflective human perception as the origin of language and 
meaning, and then Derrida’s view that language and meaning have their origin in a 
dynamic which is prior to representation. The approach to the questioning of the 
relationship between words and truth will remain within the givenness of language and 
meaning, continuing Edmund Husserl’s project which seeks the articulation of “a universal 
conformity to laws of structure on the part of conscious life, a regularity by virtue of which 
alone truth and actuality have, and are able to have, sense for us”.  
We encounter the world perspectivally and so we rightly assess claims of knowledge 
on the basis of the adequacy of the givenness of phenomena.  Our senses reveal the world 
to us but since we are perceiving from within the midst of the phenomenal world we 
understand that our pre-reflective perspective is narrow.  The world is indeterminate for us.  
The phenomenological approach is to acknowledge our perspectival limitation and avoid 
the impulse to a “high altitude” style of thinking while continuing our project of describing 
the manner in which we genuinely engage the world.  All experience becomes known to us 
in language.  To Merleau-Ponty, ‘things are said and are thought by a Speech and a 
Thought which we do not have but which has us’.1         
We use language to construct and reveal our thoughts for self-reflection in the inner 
dialogue, and for communication with others.  Classics scholar Walter Burkert has 
                                                 
 1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs trans. Richard G. McCleary, Northwestern Studies in 
Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 19. 
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hypothesized that language use (vocal sound, sign, symbol) is not what gives humans the 
status of higher animal; but rather it is our story-telling ability, narrative and discourse, 
hard-wired in human mind, that moved us from mute gestures and calls to the complex and 
layered narratives that articulate our experience of the lived-world, a complexity not given 
in the simple animal act of perception which registers only the positive or negative reaction 
as a product of a changing environment. Husserl’s conviction that an exploration of the 
structures of consciousness developed from within the experiential context would discover 
a certain reliability, assumes mechanistic qualities for cognition just such as Burkert’s 
hard-wired theory for human illustrative and explicatory abilities.   
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle’s view was that men have a natural capacity sufficient for 
truth and in most cases attain it.  So if our mechanism is working properly (we have 
normal brain function), then our thoughts should be reliable in representing the giveness of 
the world; and if our sensory mechanisms are intact, we generally grasp the world in which 
we find ourselves as a mutually agreed upon intelligible unity.  Equally important in 
Aristotle’s thought was the role of shared or public discourse and man’s ability to thus 
acquire an understanding of universals from the experience of particulars.  Michael H. 
Wedin writes that Aristotle is committed to the thesis that only things that can 
communicate have the capacity for logos in his strong linkage of reason, logos, and 
communication.2  He claims that Aristotle believed that it is not solely through the public 
or cultural use of a word that meaning attaches to human articulations; rather, words are 
given to us as already laden with meaning.  The force of Wedin’s argument rests upon 
                                                 
2. Michael H. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 
149. 
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Aristotle’s belief that humans are bearers of the ‘linguistic intention’.  This means that 
human reason can form the intention to utter a word (or string of words) to express 
particulars and that the formulation of such intentions would make no sense apart from the 
ability to express something symbolically.   
Is there a role for language in acquiring genuine rather than inferential or 
conventional understanding?  Husserl’s view in Lecture V, The Idea of Phenomenology is 
that ‘acts of knowing, more broadly apprehended as acts of thoughts in general, are not 
free-floating particularities, coming and going in the stream of consciousness.’  Rather 
they display teleological forms of interconnection; e.g., fulfillment, corroboration, 
confirmation and their counterparts.  Meaning, as intelligible unity, depends upon such 
interconnectedness and where it is lacking, there is no “sense” to be made of things.  It is 
only in these connections that ‘real spatial-temporal actuality constitutes itself – not in one 
blow, but in a gradually ascending process.’3  To Husserl the task that remains, if we are to 
grasp an authentic meaning from the giveness of the life-world, is to determine the sense of 
any and all of those correlations that we might explicate. 
We are now a century away from the beginnings of Husserlian phenomenology when 
its emphasis on concrete human experience was first taken up by philosophers who then 
pushed Husserl’s initial emphasis on the structures of interconnectedness and correlations 
in human consciousness into diverse areas of thought.  This study focuses on two such 
philosophers: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose contribution was to offer a rich description 
of the most fundamental human phenomenon, our embodied existence in a world which 
                                                 
 3. Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, ed. Rudolf Bernet, trans. Lee Hardy (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 55.  
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seems always-already structured in a way that grounds our meaning-intending acts; and 
Jacques Derrida, whose deconstructive readings have overturned the phenomenological 
landscape with particular attention to what he sees as phenomenology’s logocentric error.  
Within the general thesis of ‘language and meaning’, this study will focus upon the 
similarities and dissimilarities between Merleau-Ponty’s and Derrida’s views of the 
interconnectedness and the differentiations in language. 
One set of questions raised here concerns silence, a silence there before language 
emerges in thought, speech or writing.  The first chapter will address issues of temporality, 
spatiality, and the a priori from the standpoint of phenomenology.  Both Merleau-Ponty 
and Derrida take the linguistic structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure as a departure point 
for the arguments they want to make.  Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, in thinking about 
origins, took Saussure’s semiological structuralism, his general theory of signs and 
symbols, and his analysis of the nature and relationship of signs in language, as an 
isomorphism for the structure that brings human thought into being and which produces 
meaning. This common ground supports the relevance of a discussion of linguistics in the 
second chapter.  The third chapter is devoted to the ideas of Merleau-Ponty within the 
framework of language and meaning.   Merleau-Ponty had held the view that meanings 
expressed in language have their origin in the body’s perceptions of phenomena.  In his 
final text, he moved decisively out of the structuralist sphere in his denial of the 
structuralist thesis that syntax (form) is prior to originating, expressive speech. Derrida’s 
deconstruction of western logocentrism is the subject of the fourth chapter, with an 
emphasis upon his formulation of the precept of original repetition as a deconstruction of 
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what he sees as phenomenology’s privileging of speech as a presence-to-meaning.  Chapter 
five pulls together the oppositions of three and four in order to assess the views of  
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida in their scrutiny of language and meaning.  This final chapter 
will convey what I believe are the implications that can be taken from the task of thinking 
about language within the context of our embodied existence in the lived-world that is our 
home.  Merleau-Ponty’s interwoven flesh of the world and Derrida’s interwoven textuality 
are proposed as compatible alternatives to tradition’s reliance upon external referents in 
intellectualism and internal intuitions of empiricism for validation of what we name 
“truth”.  It was Merleau-Ponty’s hope that his work would ‘show how communication with 
others, and thought, take up and go beyond the realm of perception which initiated us into 
truth.’4     
                                                 
 4.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, trans. and ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), 3. 
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CHAPTER  1 
THE PASSAGE OF THE A PRIORI FROM SILENCE TO LANGUAGE 
 
Prefiguring the early Husserl’s emphasis on structures of interconnectedness and 
correlation in human consciousness was Immanuel Kant’s conception of apriori structures 
of the mind.  In accounting for our human ability to make sense of our world, Kant held 
that time and space are a priori constructs of mind, the form taken by the inner sense with 
which we structure experience.  From the standpoint of phenomenology, a problem in 
Kant’s concept would be the derivative status of phenomena in his formulation.  ‘The 
matter of appearances, [however], through which things in space and time are given to us, 
can be represented only in perception, thus a posteriori.’5 All experience is experience of 
something; yet Kant’s formulation privileges an antecedent split prior to perception which 
becomes unified in a meaning-giving synthesis that is the work of mind.  Kant’s                 
a priori/a posteriori dualism requires that mind provide structure to the givenness of 
phenomena – to our experience of the world – as though our world were not always 
already there structured as the ground of experience itself.  At the same time, it posits 
conditions prior to experience as the basis for the very logic it seeks to articulate.   
For Merleau-Ponty, structures of time and space are not given in reflection upon 
phenomena on the part of mind, but rather are a part of the givenness of worldly 
phenomena as perceived in pre-reflective consciousness.  For him there is a chasm between 
pre-reflection and reflection where our perception of phenomena is ordered, as a synopsis, 
in a way that is meaningful.  But the gap is not the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy nor is it 
                                                 
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 634. 
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a gap of noumenal/phenomenal dimensions because what can be known and what there is 
to know is structured from the standpoint of our embodied existence in its direct contact 
with the world.  Merleau-Ponty would say that we organize experience in the midst of 
experience, from ‘the mute and operational language of perception’.6  What originarily 
shows itself, makes itself known, is not the a priori concept but, rather, it is the 
phenomenon.  In a chasm of silence, the bits and pieces of a real and genuine phenomenal 
world wait to be noticed. 
In Husserl and the Problem of Language7, Merleau-Ponty writes that the problem of 
language had not been considered to be a proper subject for ‘first philosophy’.  Husserl, 
however, addressed the subject and what Merleau-Ponty wants is to resume what he calls 
‘the very movement’ of Husserl’s thought, instead of a particular Husserlian thesis.  
Merleau-Ponty interprets the early Husserl as positing language as an object before 
thought, an object constituted by consciousness, and actual languages as very special cases 
of a possible language to which consciousness holds the key.8  Husserl’s later writings on 
language are interpreted by Merleau-Ponty as expressing the view that language provides 
the means by which thought becomes other than a private phenomena thereby acquiring 
intersubjective value and, ultimately, ideal existence.9  But to Merleau-Ponty, human 
reflection recognizes ideal existence as neither local nor temporal and, conversely, is aware 
of a locality and temporality of speech that is neither ideal nor objective. 
                                                 
 6. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. John O’Neill, 
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973), 97. 
7. Merleau-Ponty, Signs, 84 – 97. 
 8. Ibid., 84. 
 9. Ibid., 85. 
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To Merleau-Ponty, the entity which finds itself thrown into the midst of phenomena 
and aware of its own existence as the being to whom Being matters must construct its own 
understandings on the basis of the experience in and of the world.  The ordering of 
phenomena is itself the phenomenon that is ownmost to man as the being thrown into the 
world in a way of being that is naturally constituted to perceive the world, to feel, touch, 
listen and hear, and to reflect upon and articulate the surrounding phenomena.  Even 
seemingly independent structures of categorical thought are ultimately founded in 
perception.  Human existence has no external or contingent attributes.  Man is an event of 
Being in a sense that is not that of a category in the objective world.  An objective event 
assumes the existence of a witness tied to a certain spot in the world and having successive 
views.  For Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s statement, “Transcendental subjectivity is 
intersubjectivity”, entails that ‘To the extent that what I say has meaning, I am a different 
“other” for myself when I am speaking; and to the extent that I understand, I no longer 
know who is speaking and who is listening’.10 
The transformation from the reality of experience to representation of experience in 
language is accomplished when a perspective, a standpoint, is taken by an embodied 
understanding instantiated in the phenomenal world.  Husserl opposed a psychological 
theory which would claim that we intuit truth through subjective feelings of conviction 
‘experienced in the presence of certain judgments.’11  Appearances often deceive us, and 
not only in exemplar cases of illusion such as trompe l’oeil and façade, but also in the most 
concrete judgments about our own embodied experience. Gail Soffer notes an example 
                                                 
 10. Ibid., 97. 
 11. Gail Soffer, Husserl and the Question of Relativism (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991) 66. 
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intended to illustrate the failure of the phenomenological approach in distinguishing 
between truth and illusion: the objection of Gunther Patzig.  Patzig has argued that a 
person sitting in a train at rest and seeing another train moving out of the station, 
experiences that it is his train that is moving.  Patzig argues that, for Husserl, that person’s 
train really is moving, since he sees that it is moving.  Soffer counters that if the person’s 
train were actually moving, he would begin to see through the window a rush of landscape 
go by.  Instead he sees only the train station at rest with the other train gone.  ‘The initial 
phenomena (“my train is moving”) breaks up, and is replaced by a new one (“my train is at 
rest, the other train was moving”).  Thus it is not the case that, phenomenologically 
considered, the person’s train is really moving simply because it is perceived to be moving 
in a single, isolated moment.’12  Perception of phenomena relies upon a series of partial, 
perspectival views as given to consciousness.  If what presents itself as real is real, there is 
a synthesis of fulfillment.  Otherwise, the perception ‘breaks up’.  Soffer asserts that for 
Husserl the primary sense of truth is that ‘the essential correspondence is of meaning-
intention to meaning-fulfillment.’, both elements of which are internal to experience.13   
The a priori for Husserl is contained in meaning formations given in the chasm 
between our apprehension of givenness and that which gives, the already constituted lived-
world.  What structures our experience is not rooted in mind; rather, paradoxically, the 
universal features of mind are structured in experience, grounded in the external world.  
We are always already immersed in a pre-given world which we can perceive only 
partially, according to our perspective within that world; but certain structural elements 
                                                 
12. Ibid. 98, n.38. 
 13. Ibid. 79. 
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stand out that are the conditions for the existence of the life-world.  These elemental 
aspects are the meaning-giving structures that pre-figure any of our perceptions in the 
phenomenal world.  Our perception is the meaning-bestower in a two-way relationship that 
is the foundational concept of Fundierung.14   Peter Hadreas explains that for Merleau-
Ponty ‘bodily involvements and language are “moments” of each other.  Speech is not 
meaningful without its interpenetration into human projects; and, on the other hand, human 
projects are shaped and questioned –in general take their place –in language’.15 
We are perceivers, always already thrown into a world.  In becoming aware of our 
own experience, we can say that we have had a “perception”.  This is what Heidegger has 
called a “harking back” to something else to which a perception points that lets something 
be seen as something. Implicit in the description of perception as a “harking back” is a 
repudiation of a “purely present” moment wherein consciousness and being coincide.  
Mearleau-Ponty’s “primacy” of perception refers to the fact that we first experience, 
perceive, the givenness of the world; our existence as perceivers is primary.  Language has 
a presence for us, it exists, because bodily gestures can convey meaning.  An already 
available structure of gesture is part of our embodied existence in the phenomenal world.  
In inner dialogue or in communication with others, we make sense of our perceptions.  
There is “meaning” to be had because we are in a world that is always already there.  
Making-sense of experience is its conceptualization into language.  Language is “thought’s 
                                                 
 14.  Merleau-Ponty applies Husserl’s concept of Fundierung in the sense that reflective objectivity 
and embodied subjectivity are related as the founded and the founding.  Husserl defines Fundierung as 
follows: If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive unity 
which it associates with an M, we say that an A as such requires foundation by an M or also that an A as 
such needs to be supplemented by an M., as quoted by Peter J. Hadreas in In Place of the Flawed Diamond 
(New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1986), 96. 
 15. Ibid., 105. 
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body” and its givenness structures the possibility of what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘question-
knowing … “What do I know?” is not only “what is knowing?” and not only “who am I?” 
but finally: “what is there?” and even: “what is the there is?”.’16    
Language provides the means for an ‘uncovering’ in which Dasein can bring its 
perceptions to understanding.  The ‘uncovering’ is in terms of comparing, relating, setting 
forth, recounting, and so forth which give understanding.  The uncovering is enacted by 
Dasein from the standpoint of a pre-existing horizon of meaning possible in its lived-
world, which becomes a virtual second-nature of man.  If the ordering does not precede the 
perception, Dasein’s thrownness would be a fall into a chaos of sensory data from which 
mind and language would then, in immediacy, have to construct ‘reality’.17  But this is not 
to say that the reality that language/discourse constructs is not reality-as-such.   
The language of experience is, for Merleau-Ponty, sedimented, in the sense of a 
conceptual ordering of experience in the phenomenal world wherein a thing appears as a 
what-it-is.  We are thrown into a world structured and ordered in sedimentation, pre-
conditioned for the emergence of a being who understands his Being.  Human perception, 
then, should not be thought of as a synthesis of the structures of finite intellect 
superimposed upon its world; rather, it is an articulation of the intelligibility of the world.18  
                                                 
 16. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible & the Invisible,  trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. Claude LeFort (Indiana: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 129. 
 17.  The experiences of ‘the holy’ have been described as “terrible”, which suggests that language 
cannot mediate such experience perhaps for the reason that the sedimented structures of the lived-world do 
not apply.  Dreams are dream-like in that they lack the points of reference (time, space) of the lived-world.  
As Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘I do not look at chaos, but at things’. The Visible & the Invisible, 133.       
 18. Stephen Priest, Merleau-Ponty, (New York: Routledge Press: 1998), critiques Merleau-Ponty’s 
view of Kant. ‘If we do not understand transcendental idealism as idealism then we do not have to ascribe to 
Kant the view that space and time are literally parts of our psychology.  We may take him to be saying that it 
is necessary and a priori that any object of our inner experience will be temporal and any object of our outer 
experience will be spatio-temporal’, 254.  
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This view will give rise in the later Merleau-Ponty of The Visible and the Invisible to the 
thesis of autochthonous organization, the concept by which he argues that originary 
meaningfulness of experience is to be understood.   
Paradoxically, the intelligibility of the world that man must articulate in order to 
understand the meaning of “things” is only given to us as the absence of any meaning.  We 
are always reconstructing the immediate through reflection.  Absolute givenness, presence 
to meaning, is impossible for a being which is itself an event of being.  As the event of its 
own becoming unfolds for man it is with a withdrawal of presence that the realization 
dawns that we are both “present to” and “present as”; that is, man exists as both subject 
and object.  Man wants to come to grips with the problem of recapturing that unmediated 
present, the event just prior to reflection which he can never capture, the aha-Erlebnis 
which is already past.  As both “subject” and “subject to”, man struggles to ‘recapture the 
elusive unity of the phenomenal world in the finite web of concepts woven by language’.19 
Man’s finite perspective is the basis of his individuality.  Human time is constructed 
through instances of being-present in a sequence of the past-present.  But this is not the 
time that belongs to things.  The nature of the time of things is that it is fully constituted, a 
series of possible relations in terms of before and after that is the ultimate recording of time 
and the result of its passage.  Merleau-Ponty asserts that ‘points in time are bound together, 
not by any identifying synthesis which would fix them at a point in time, but by a 
                                                 
 19.  Martin Dillon, “Apriority in Kant and Merleau-Ponty”,  Kant Studien 78  (1987),  422. 
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transition synthesis, in so far as they issue one from the other…’.20  A synthesis in terms of 
a “before” and an “after” must be made in order to understand experience, but for  
Merleau-Ponty, this synthesis must always be undertaken afresh as a dimension of our 
being.   
‘It is indeed the dream of philosophers to be able to conceive an “eternity of 
life”, lying beyond permanence and change, in which time’s productivity is 
pre-eminently contained, and yet a thetic consciousness of time which stands 
above it and embraces it merely destroys the phenomena of time’.21    
 
For Merleau-Ponty, man exists as a ‘duration’ whose questioning begins first with  
the “look”, the gaze of man at the pre-reflective level of perception prior to any 
thematization and unavailable to expression-in-language.  Experience is initially given to 
the body in this pre-reflective mode and it is the body which is structured to organize the 
sensory contents of the experience toward a unity of meaningfulness, providing a direction 
and intentionality that is the unfolding of experience within time and space.  Perception is 
the transcendence of the present to conscious thought in a consistent and coherent form 
because perception and thought are about real things in the real world.  In Being and Time, 
Heidegger wrote that the ek-stasis of the present is projected authentically as Augenblick, a 
moment at which the ready-to-hand is available to Dasein in a way that reflects Dasein’s 
freedom.  So too for Merleau-Ponty, the ek-stasis is pre-reflective and it must be real.  The 
authentic mode of the ek-stasis of the future, for Heidegger, is a looking forward to 
possibilities, Vorlaufen, in the sense of Dasein’s own being-able-to-be, which is Merleau-
Ponty’s “I can”. 
                                                 
 20. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: 
Routledge, 1962), 415. 
 21. Ibid. 
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In the immediacy of the pre-reflective present, man’s embodiment falls within the 
spatiality and temporality of the lived-world.  Man speaks with the body by virtue of a 
quantity of air and its vibration, which is conditioned by the vocal cavities.  Sound can be 
said to be material in the sense that its existence as a natural phenomenon relies upon 
matter.  The elasticity of air, ground and water (its compression-rarefaction-compression-
rarefaction pattern) allows waves of vibratory compression waves to move away from a 
source.  For sound to exist in a “pure” sense (that is, whether heard by the human ear or 
not), for there to be a sound, there must be a material medium through which the vibrations 
travel in their wave pattern.  Sound, as such, is not possible in a vacuum; the media in 
which sounds occur are structures of the lived-world that man pre-reflectively utilizes in 
producing sound (speech) with the wind–instrument that is the human voice.22  Sound in 
the human life-world doesn’t require a human instrument, most animals have “calls”.  Man 
articulates.  He produces a speech sound by moving an articulator, the parts of his body 
that enable speech, and he creates meaning by joining together a string of distinct syllables 
and words, the parts of speech.  Such a cohesion is, ipso facto, available to any embodied 
worldly being, but it is solely to man that the domain of the space of the narrative is given. 
 For Merleau-Ponty ‘time’ is not an infinite series of events.  He writes in the  
 
working notes to his final (and unfinished) work, The Visible and the Invisible:  
 
‘The upsurge of time would be incomprehensible as the creation of a 
supplement of time that would push the whole preceding series back into the 
past.  That passivity is not conceivable.  On the other hand every analysis of 
                                                 
 22. Merleau-Ponty names man’s activities that are neither solely mental nor solely material “human 
predicates”.  These are activities ascribed to the whole human being in contrast to objects and other living 
things.  This is essential in Merleau-Ponty’s departure from an anthropocentric philosophical tradition. 
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time that views it from above is insufficient.  Time must constitute itself – be 
always seen from the point of view of someone who is of it’.23    
 
 Merleau-Ponty twice uses a passage from Paul Claudel’s Art poétique to illustrate man’s  
 




‘From time to time, a man lifts his head, sniffs, listens, considers, recognizes 
his position: he thinks, he sighs, and, drawing his watch from the pocket 
lodged against his chest, looks at the time.  Where am I?  and What time is it? 
–such is the inexhaustible question turning from us to the world. . .’24 
 
‘Time is not an absolute series of events, a tempo –not even the tempo of consciousness – 
it is an institution, a system of equivalences’.25  Meaning and structure are formed where 
the incarnate subject and the worldly event come together.  ‘Taking our bearings’ is a way 
for us to mark our present position, as a means of affirming our being-in-the-world as 
embodied at the present position in time.  Merleau-Ponty defined man as ‘a duration’ 
whose ego is identical with the act in which it projects itself.  The present is a kind of 
geometrical locus for self and others, an assignable reality, within the lived-world with its 
sedimented patterns of experience.  The conscious, temporal subject influences events and 
is influenced by them.  Merleau-Ponty began The Visible and the Invisible saying: 
 ‘We see the things themselves, the world is what we see. . .  we must match 
this vision with knowledge, take possession of it, say what we and what seeing 
are, act therefore as if we knew nothing about it, as if here we still had 
everything to learn.’26          
 
                                                 
 23. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible & the Invisible, 184. 
 24. Ibid., 108, 121. 
 25. Ibid., 3 – 4. 
 26. Ibid., 3. 
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Merleau-Ponty’s only ‘ideality’ is his concept of sedimentation; his only apriori is in the 
sedimented patterns of experience, such as perception, understanding, and the overarching 
enworlding condition of the embodiment of man.   
Merleau-Ponty thought that linguistics, and particularly language under the structural 
model of Ferdinand de Saussure, taught that, although life’s questions are asked and 
answered in words, a language tells us nothing except about itself.  ‘Far from harboring the 
secret of the being of the world, language is itself a world…27   The locus of truth and 
meaning, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, is then no longer to be sought in mind with its 
phenomenal limitation or in a coincidence of mind and object; its site is, rather, in a 
sedimented system of language which relies on the bodily gesture.         
Derrida challenges the idea that there is a retrievable domain of primordial 
experience upon which an authentic understanding of experience can be founded.  He 
argues that the primacy of speech held since Husserl is ultimately a primacy of presence.  
For Derrida there can be no ‘pure presence’, no ‘pure meaning’.  The force of his argument 
lies in his assertion that once thought is taken up into understanding, the world has 
intervened.  There can be no immediate self-present thought since thought is always 
mediated by the agency of signs.  Nonpresence and otherness are internal to presence.  As 
Derrida asserts,  
‘Signs represent the present in its absence; they take the place of the 
present….when the present does not present itself, then we signify, we go 
through the detour of signs…. The substitution of the sign for the thing itself is 
both secondary and provisional: it is second in order after an original and lost 
presence, a presence from which the sign would be derived.’28   
                                                 
 27. Ibid., 96. 
 28. Jacques Derrida, “Difference” in Phenomena and Speech, trans. David Allison (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 136. 
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For Derrida, the detour of the present into representation is temporalizing; the past present 
is deferred to representation in the actuality of the living present.  The representation 
occurs within a system of signifiers, a system of intervals, spacing, and of difference in the 
sense of not being identical.  Differance as temporalizing and differance as spacing are the 
concepts Derrida employs to overcome the privileging of presence he sees as an error in 
philosophical thought that continued through Husserl and the phenomenological school of 
thought.  Derrida does not contest the founding validity of presence as there can be no 
foundation without presence.  But the conditions of experience are not Kantian abstractions 
for Derrida; the conditions necessary for experience are concretely lived.  It is re-
presentation, a calling back of the “sense” of experience, that marks the difference of the 
“then” and the “now” and establishes for man the vulgar sense of time.  And it is in the 
joining and disjoining of signs and symbols that language articulates space.  The only 
ideality for Derrida (that is, in our context here, and under the proviso that concepts such as 
“ideality” are always-already ‘under erasure’ in Derrida’s thought) is that of the 
recognition in experience by individual consciousness of “the same” and in the sense of 
“sameness” prior to the immediate experience which consciousness is presently reflecting 
upon. 
‘A signifier is from the very beginning the possibility of its own repetition, of 
its own image or resemblance.  It is the condition of its ideality, what identifies 
it as a signifier, and makes it function as such, relating it to a signified which, 
for the same reasons, could never be a “unique and singular reality”.’29 
 
Derrida’s critique moves further than Merleau-Ponty’s displacement of the tradition’s view  
                                                 
29.  Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), 91. 
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of the a priori.  Merleau-Ponty asserts the primacy of perception: 
 
‘Fact and essence can no longer be distinguished, not because, mixed up in our 
experience, they in their purity would be inaccessible and would subsist as 
limit-ideas beyond our experience, but because –Being no longer being before 
me, but surrounding me and in a sense transversing me, and my vision of 
Being not forming itself from elsewhere, but from the midst of Being –the 
alleged facts, the spatial-temporal individuals, are from the first mounted on 
the axes, the pivots, the dimensions, the generality of my body, and the ideas 
are therefore already encrusted in its joints.’30 
 
Derrida includes “perception” in his critique of the operative concepts of Western 
philosophy:   
  
‘Now I don’t know what perception is and I don’t believe anything like 
perception exists.  Perception is precisely a concept, a concept of an intuition 
or of a given originating from the thing itself, present itself in its meaning, 
independently from language, from the system of reference.  And I believe that 
perception is interdependent with the concept of origin and of center and 
consequently whatever strikes at the metaphysics of which I have spoken 
strikes also at the very concept of perception.  I don’t believe that there is any 
perception.’31 
 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida concur in their rejection of a metaphysics of presence to 
meaning.  For Merleu-Ponty, presence is mediated by the body’s experience in the life-
world, which is itself a sedimented system structured like language.  For Derrida, presence 
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THE STRUCTURAL MODEL IN LINGUISTICS 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty began to draw upon the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure in the 
late 1940s in a desire to rejoin the general philosophical problem of expression and 
institution.  John O’Neill, in his ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to The Prose of the World, 
distinguishes between the ‘institution of language as an objective structure studied by 
linguistics, and speech, which is the use-value language acquires when turned toward 
expression and the institution of new meanings’(xxxiv).  Merleau-Ponty’s view was that,  
‘We may say that there are two languages.  First there is the language after the 
fact, or language as an institution, which effaces itself in order to yield the 
meaning which it conveys.  Second, there is the language which creates itself 
in its expressive acts, which sweeps me on from the signs toward meaning –
sedimented language and speech.’32   
 
To Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical tradition had erred in its treatment of language as an 
exclusively technical question. He sought, within a phenomenological reflection, ‘a new 
conception of the being of language, which is now logic in contingency -an oriented 
system which nevertheless always elaborates random factors, taking what was fortuitous 
up again into a meaningful whole – incarnate logic’.33   
Sassurean linguistics would later draw the attention of Derrida, coming first in Of 
Grammatology in 1967.  Derrida’s purpose was to relate Saussure’s distinction between 
sign and signified to the expression/indication dynamic, and for the linguistics to serve as a 
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point of departure for Derrida’s deconstruction of what he saw as a priority traditionally 
accorded to the language of speech over the language of writing.  He argues that 
Saussure’s analysis demonstrates, through his concept of diachronic linguistics, that 
language cannot be reduced to subjective meaning.  Derrida interprets (or deconstructs) 
Saussure in a way that conforms to Derrida’s movement away from a metaphysics of 
“presence to meaning”.  ‘Hearing-oneself-speak is identified as the unique experience of 
the signified producing itself spontaneously within the self, and nevertheless, as signified 
concept, in the element of ideality or universality’.34  It was in opposition to the traditional 
view of speech as unmediated intuition of self-presence, in the sense of “hearing oneself 
speak”, that prompted Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure.  
Saussure’s genius was that he first marked out the holistic character of language, as a 
system whose parts are always coming under the influence of one another, changing, 
acquiring values and shaping further change within an interwoven whole.  The particular 
concepts of Saussure’s that concern us here are: the relationship between sign and 
signifier; and the diachronic and synchronic perspectives.  Saussure’s thesis of sign and 
signifier will become important in advancing Derrida’s concept of differance.  Saussure’s 
diachronic law will provide Merleau-Ponty with an isomorphism for his own concepts of 
sedimentation and autochthonous origin. 
In the section entitled Nature of the Linguistic Sign,35 Saussure clarifies the nature of 
the most elemental function of language.  Tradition had held that at its most basic level 
language was a naming-process.  To Saussure, this was wrong on two counts: first, it 
                                                 
 34. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 20. 
 35. Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, 
trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 65. 
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assumes the existence of ‘ready-made ideas’ prior to words; and secondly, it assumes that 
the linking of a name and a thing is a simple operation.  For Saussure, ‘The linguistic sign 
unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image’.36  The sound-image is 
non-material, it is an impression made by our sensory experience in the lived-world.  In 
reflection, almost instantaneously, a concept and certain syllables deemed legitimate in the 
thinker’s language unite into the linguistic sign.  Seeking exactitude, Saussure designates  
the meanings and the words thusly:     
sign – means the united whole; 
signified – means the concept; and 
        signifier – means the sound-image.   
 
The union between signified and signifier is not based upon an inner necessity in terms of 
the way certain syllables of a language sound.  This is made self-evident by the existence 
of the numerous languages of man.  The link between thought and sound is purely 
arbitrary, as can be seen in the example of signs for “horse” which in German is Pferd, 
Turkish at, French chevel, and Latin equus.  Saussure’s view is that nothing enters 
language without having been tested in speaking and that every innovation in language has 
its roots in the individual.   
Two forces are always at work in language: individualism (or provincialism) on the 
one hand, and social intercourse (or communication) on the other.  This is most starkly 
revealed by observing the evolution of language in childhood.  Without social intercourse, 
peculiar individual childhood language patterns would take hold and remain with the 
language-user.  And conversely, social groups inspire the innovations that we see in the 
vernacular of technologies, in rapper or valley girl slang, and any such idiosyncrasies that 
                                                 
 36. Ibid., 66. 
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mark language-users as members of a particular set.  It is generally held that if a particular 
language system is not learned in early childhood, there will always be a “foreign accent”.  
Once the vocal apparatus (the glottis, vocal folds, lips, tongue, the soft palate and the 
uvula) becomes proficient in making sounds a certain way (within the patterns of the 
mother-tongue; i.e., the th sound in English, the dorsal r and tongue-tip r trill in French), 
oral articulations necessary for other languages become difficult if not impossible to the 
speaker.  The effort required in articulating languages learned in adulthood reveals a 
distinction in: (a) language competence (the subconscious control of a linguistic system), 
and (b) language performance (the speaker’s actual use of language).  The bond then 
between signifier and signified differs in intensity within an individual depending upon 
whether the language is given in writing or in speech, whether he is given a space of time 
to reflect and translate, and how agile he is in “thinking” and “speaking” from within a 
language system “foreign” to him.     
 Important in terms of the study that engages us here is the nature of the bond 
between signified and signifier in Saussures’s linguistic system.  Saussure asserts that our 
thought is only a shapeless and indistinct mass apart from its expression in words.  The 
lived-world gives an indefinite plane of jumbled ideas and an equally vague plane of 
sounds.  Their combination produces a form and not a substance.  ‘The important thing in 
the word is not the sound alone but the phonic differences that make it possible to 
distinguish this word from all others, for differences carry signification’.37  For Saussure, 
implicit in difference is a comparison, and so he adds that they are not different; they are 
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only distinct.  Between words there is only opposition and whatever distinguishes one sign 
from the others constitutes it.    
 Saussure asserts that there is an isomorphism in the structure for speech and the 
structure of writing.  He clarifies this position by noting the standard form in writing: 
1) The signs used in writing are arbitrary; there is no connection, for example,    
between the letter t and the sound that it designates. 
2) The value of letters is purely negative and differential. 
3) Values in writing function only through reciprocal opposition within a fixed 
system that consists of a set number of letters.  This third characteristic, though 
not identical to the second, is closely related to it, for both depend on the first. 
4) The means by which the sign is produced is completely unimportant.38  
   
Signs - written, spoken, or thought - function not through their intrinsic value but through  
their relative position within a sentence or thought, and within the language system to 
which they belong.  Signs mutually condition each other and what distinguishes one sign 
from another constitutes it.  What is not arbitrary is the way in which words within a given 
language system are linked in order for strings of words to make sense.  The distinction 
between one sign and another naturally includes their spacing, in speech and in writing.  
Saussure’s thinking regarding the structure of written language will later play a part in 
Derrida’s critique of the priority the structuralist movement accords spoken over written 
language. 
 Saussure distinguishes between the study of a language system’s historical changes 
in time, and the relationships within a system of language at a particular time.  Synchronic 
linguistics refers to the static side of language, or language states; and diachronic 
linguistics to the study of the evolutionary aspect in language, changes over time.  The 
synchronic law reports a state of affairs, a principle of regularity.  The diachronic law 
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supposes a dynamic force, an effect produced, a change in language over time.  Diachronic 
changes are the subject of anthropologists and historians – and require an objective 
analysis.  Synchronic changes involve subjective analyses on the part of speakers.  It is 
only by virtue of speaking that any diachronic change in language occurs.  A certain 
number of speakers, individuals, initiate a change before it becomes accepted in general 
use.  A diachronic fact is preceded by another fact: the synchronic fact in the sphere of 
speaking.  Diachronic linguistics notes causes, such as geographic diversity, and temporal 
diversity, the innovating waves of change over time.  Diachronics is a field of study that 
examines direct evidence, historical documents, and employs textual criticism in a 
reconstructive effort supported by comparison and observation of the chain of events that 
initiated the innovations.  For Merleau-Ponty, diachronic linguistics will serve as an 
isomorphism for the principle of ‘sedimentation’ in man’s embodied experience of the 
world.  The geological metaphor Saussure applies to language systems applies also to 
man’s enworlding and the grounding of meaning that Merleau-Ponty wants to assign to the 
givenness of worldly phenomena. 
Saussure’s principal interest lies in synchronic linguistics, ‘the linguistics that  
penetrates values and co-existing relationships’39 in order to describe a static language 
state.  Unlike a symbol, a linguistic sign cannot exist in space without being rendered 
meaningless.  The linear span of the word chain must be divided for meaning to emerge.  
When a conversation in a foreign language with which one has a certain familiarity is 
overheard, it makes no sense because, unlike the written text, there is no way to recognize 
where the breaks or divisions in the linear span occur.  Saussure asserts the priority of 
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‘linguistic value’ into this circumstance.  Although the bond between signifier and 
signified is arbitrary, once formed as a united whole (a word-unit) and successfully 
launched into general use it acquires value.  The value of the word, its property of standing 
for an idea, owes its existence solely to usage, general acceptance, and the difference in its 
value from that of other words in the language system.  Values emerge from the signifying 
power of speech for Saussure.   
 For Saussure, language is not controlled directly by the intentions of speakers.  
Languages evolve.  Saussure attributes to sheer luck the fact that any language persists 
over time and announces the mystery, namely, that thought and sound become 
conceptualized in the form of language.  
‘The characteristic role of language with respect to thought is not to create a 
material phonic means for expressing ideas but to serve as a link between 
thought and sound, under conditions that of necessity bring about the 
reciprocal delimitations of units.  Thought, chaotic by nature, has to become 
ordered in the process of its decomposition.  Neither are thoughts given 
material form nor are sounds transformed into mental entities; the somewhat 
mysterious fact is rather that “thought-sound” implies division, and that 
language works out its units while taking shape between two shapeless 
masses.’40   
 
                                                 






Perception is primary, meaning originates in perception for Merleau-Ponty.  ‘To seek 
the essence of a perception is to declare that perception is, not presumed true, but defined 
as access to truth.’41  For Merleau-Ponty our perception of the world is fundamental.  A 
primordial perception must occur before even a subject-object distinction is made.  We are 
always already in-the-world and, because we are, we are ‘condemned to meaning’.  Every 
act, every intention acquires a “name”.  Each encounter necessarily reveals a relationship 
between world, ground and figure.  A perceptual “something” is always in the middle of 
something more; it always exists as part of a field.  With-in a field, perception occurs from 
a standpoint, a perspective taken by a some-one, in an attentiveness framed within the field 
of a sensory horizon.  Merleau-Ponty asserts that the 
‘first operation of attention is to create for itself a field, either perceptual or 
mental, which can be “surveyed” (uberschauen), in which movement of the 
exploratory organ or elaboration of thought are possible, but in which 
consciousness does not correspondingly lose what it has gained and, moreover, 
lose itself in the changes it brings about’.42   
 
Every new experience is a change to consciousness in terms of the establishment of a new 
dimension of experience.  We are an ever-present absentmindedness and bewilderment in 
the shape of the body.  As a human being  
‘I know where I am and see myself among things, it is because I am a 
consciousness, a strange creature which resides nowhere and can be 
everywhere present in intention. Everything that exists exists as a thing or as a 
consciousness. And there is no half-way house. The thing is in a place but 
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perception is nowhere, for if it were situated in a place it could not make other 
things exist for itself, since it would repose in itself as things do.  Perception is 
thus thought about perceiving.  Its incarnation furnishes no characteristic 
which has to be accounted for, and its thisness (ecceity) is simply its own 
ignorance of itself.’43   
 
The body and consciousness are the visible and the invisible of man.  Within what 
Merleau-Ponty calls “perceptual faith”, the body ‘makes itself its own natural light’44 and, 
in perceiving, segregates the “within” from the “without”.  Perception, thought this way, is 
interrogative thought which lets the perceived world be rather than posits it.45  From within 
(from the invisible), we correlate our evidence (the visible) with that of others, 
perspectives blend, perceptions confirm one another, a meaning emerges and this is the 
praxis of embodied rationality, the recognition of the fundamental facts of our existence.  
In practice, consciousness doesn’t have to intervene at each stage to recognize and name 
what is given.  Perception occurs within a living system of meanings, an immanent logic at 
work in the sensible field, and, spontaneously, we recognize the visible by its style.  We 
access the visible between the aspects of it, through texture, the surface of a depth, a cross 
section.  The invisible is what is hidden, the existentials of the visible, its dimensions, its 
non-figurative inner framework.  Any object of perception is partially-given to 
consciousness and what is phenomenologically visible is founded upon the invisible, and 
conversely, the invisible is founded upon the visible. 
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Human vision, ‘the questing eye’,46 is our prereflective relationship to the world.  
For Merleau-Ponty, perception opens to a visual field that is a Gestalt, an open system of 
shifting patterns that is given to humans as an organized, coherent whole.  It is at the nexus 
of the active lived-through body and the patterned structures of the world that meaning is 
formed.  The visible and the invisible constitute the whole.  In Signs, Merleau-Ponty 
writes:  
‘…with our first oriented gesture, someone’s infinite relationships to his 
situation has invaded our mediocre planet and opened an inexhaustible field to 
our behavior.  All perception, all action which presupposes it, and in short 
every human use of the body is already primordial expression.  Not that 
derivative labor which substitutes for what is expressed signs which are given 
elsewhere with their meaning and rule of usage, but the primary operation 
which first constitutes signs as signs, makes that which is expressed dwell in 
them through the eloquence of their arrangement and configuration alone, 
implants a meaning in that which did not have one, and thus- far from 
exhausting itself in the instant at which it occurs –inaugurates an order or 
founds an institution or a tradition’.47     
 
The bits and pieces of the world-in-itself wait to be noticed, to be given names.  Martin 
Dillon writes that the question this raises is the how and why of accounting for ‘the 
subsumption of a given perceptual experience under a given concept or sign’,48 given 
Saussure’s thesis of the arbitrariness of signs.  On the surface it would seem that either 
signs are applied arbitrarily or that a particular precept demands a particular sign.  
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘doctrine of autochthonous organization maintains that there is a 
fundamental organization to the world as perceived that is not constituted by the act of 
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perception’.49  He conceives perception as a pre-reflective openness on to the world which 
gives a cognition of the world at the level of perception, gives the world a meaning-for-us.  
We open upon a world of which we are a part in a primordial intertwining of the visible 
and the invisible of man and world.  The style, the mode of self-presentation, of what is 
given makes the demand on us to perceive something as what-it-is, as a lake and not a 
house, etc.  Cognition is at the primordial level for Merleau-Ponty, and not on the level of 
language systems.  Fundamental to Merleau-Ponty’s vision is his concept of sedimentation.          
Sedimentation, the living system of meaning, is an essential feature of Merleau-
Ponty’s vision.  There is a world of thought, or a sediment, left by our mental processes 
which enables us to rely on our concepts and acquired judgments as we might on things 
there in front of us, presented globally, without there being any need for us to resynthesize 
them.50 While the visible counts so much for us and has an absolute prestige, the past, the 
future, and the elsewhere are features of: 
‘a whole architecture, a whole complex of phenomena “in tiers,” a whole series 
of “levels of being”… there is no individual that would not be representative of 
a species or of a family of beings, would not have, would not be a certain style, 
a certain manner of managing the domain of space and time over which it has 
competency, of pronouncing, of articulating that domain, of radiating about a 
wholly virtual center –in short, a certain manner of being, in the active 
sense…’51   
 
The concept of sedimentation means the settling of culture into things. 
 
The world of meanings is not before us in a static sense.  Just as, when in and 
among the world of things, we can move across a room avoiding people and chairs either 
deliberately or spontaneously, so too sedimented meanings, the “mental panorama”, may 
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be given clearly or vaguely.  Time alters the force of the immediate perception and our thin 
autonomy retains perceptions as temporal strata within our mental panorama, our private 
world of thought.  However consciousness is not a private summing up; it is an ek-stasic 
field of experience, a lived-relationship to the spatial and temporal field that is the world.  
To see some-thing, for Merleau-Ponty, is to have at a distance from a human vantage point 
in space, the space that geometry explains. We see the world from within it and we can 
never regain the immediate, for if it were possible to do so, we would have changed it in 
the process.  Unlike Kant, to whom the cogito is an empty form of thought, ‘We are 
restoring to the cogito a temporal thickness.  If there is not endless doubt, and if “I think”, 
it is because I plunge on into provisional thoughts and, by deeds, overcome time’s 
discontinuity.’52  Available to the intentionality of the present thought, sedimented 
meanings are not a final gain.  The present thought augments the meaning of the past 
present thought and is in return revised and updated.  We are always separated from the 
immediate ‘by the whole thickness of [my] present’.53  Sedimented meanings enrich 
present consciousness and are primary in the formation of human rationality as opposed to 
instinctual or obsessive thinking.54   
Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body in 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking.  The body is an expressive space and our embodiment forces us 
to acknowledge meanings which are particular, rather than universal.  We belong to time 
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and space; the body combines with them and includes them.  Sedimented beneath our idea 
of objective space is the experience of our own body in inhabiting space.  ‘Experience 
discloses… a primitive spatiality of which experience is merely the outer covering and 
which merges with the body’s very being’.55  The appropriation of space takes place in the 
body, in its understanding of itself as a space.  Our perception gives a sensory image, for 
example, “a tight space” or “big-sky openness”, that is not formed by us as an operation of 
the intellect.  Without our bodily experience as a-space-in-and-of-space, our concept of 
space would be a dimensionless flatness.  We are a space in both the visible and invisible 
sense in Merleau-Ponty’s model.  We visibly take up room and we are a series of invisible 
spaces held together by our visible body.  We are in space in the sense of our standpoint 
from within the space of a visible lived-world, yet that world is invisible to us by virtue of 
the unnumbered vantage points, either available or unavailable to us, an unknown larger 
space unavailable either subjectively or objectively.  This is why Merleau-Ponty asserts 
that the relationship between the embodied subject and the lived-world is not to be 
understood on the basis of an intellectual operation between epistemological subject and 
objects.  
‘Indeed, the natural world presents itself as existing in itself over and above its 
existence for me; the act of transcendence whereby the subject is thrown open 
to the world runs away with itself and we find ourselves in the presence of a 
nature which has no need to be perceived in order to exist.’56 
 
We see the world, that is, perceive the world, straightforwardly, as it is to us.  It is only in 
reflection that we intellectualize our own stance into a point of view that is relative to any 
and every other point of view.  Within the “perceptual faith” mode, we accept what is 
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given as “true” without any consideration of the ubiquitous underlay of scientific 
formulations set up as objective truth.  In perceptual faith, we recognize associations and 
resemblances, things reappear without reason, sensations and unbidden images develop 
and what we perceive is true, but only in the sense that it is real to us.  Intellectual 
reflection reveals to us a perspective taken, that the body has operated to reveal a series of 
one-sided perceptions in a partially-given, never totally-given, reality.         
Upon reflection, we recognize that, in addition to our own perspective, there are 
indefinite numbers of other perspectives available both to us and to others.  We can vary 
our perspective indefinitely, take a different standpoint, merely by taking a step, and then 
another in a never-ending series.  The ‘visible present… stops up my view, that is, time 
and space extend beyond the visible present, and at the same time they are behind it, in 
depth, in hiding.  The visible can fill me and occupy me only because I who see it do not 
see it from the depths of nothingness, but from the midst of itself’.57  The richness of our 
experience of the world is structured, for Merleau-Ponty, in the sedimented layers existent 
in the world over and above its existence “for me”.  The natural world is an ordered totality 
and each encounter within that totality alters, enriches and modifies, what was assumed in 
the “perceptual faith” mode.  We are continually surprised by the “new”, a turn of phrase, a 
fresh curve.  From within the space of ourselves, we create meaning from the foundation of 
sedimented understandings both in ourselves and in the organization of our lived-world.  
Our partial perspectives constitute our experience within the overall structures of the 
lived-world of our perceptions. The experience is not in terms of ‘ready-made ideas’ but 
there are conditions for the possibility of experience that structure what that experience can 
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be.  Merleau-Ponty’s sense of the Fundierung concept (the institution/expression dynamic) 
is amended in his assertion that we recognize things that have been “named”, while ‘the 
most familiar thing remains indeterminate so long as we have not recalled its name’.58  We 
have a kind of ignorance of our thoughts until we have formulated them for ourselves: we 
begin to speak without knowing what we will say; writers begin projects without knowing 
exactly what they are going to put into them.  We perceive an object and know it by its 
name.  When our eyes fall upon a tree, we do not represent to ourselves the concept of tree.  
Words have meaning and it is through language that we reach objects.  ‘Speech, in the 
speaker, does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it’,59 prior to any 
thematization or mental synthesis.  
It was in On the Phenomenology of Language60 that Merleau-Ponty connected his 
theory of language with the linguistics of Saussure.  Merleau-Ponty held that Saussure’s 
distinction between synchrony and diachrony in language was a distinction between speech 
and language.61  Synchrony was held by Merleau-Ponty to refer to the “originality” of 
present speech while diachrony would refer to the past, the history, of a language.  He 
maintained that while all developments in language can be observed in a retrospective 
view that looks forward to change, all change in language has had its beginning in speech.  
When enough people at a given time adopt a new sign in speech, it becomes established as 
a part of the whole of a language.  These synchronic aspects of change can be seen as 
slices of time cutting into the diachronic stream of the language system.   
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‘At first the “subjective” point of view envelops the “objective” point of view; 
synchrony envelops diachrony.  The past of language began by being 
present…. In another connection, diachrony envelops synchrony.  If language 
allows random elements when it is considered according to a longitudinal 
section, the system of synchrony must at every moment allow fissures where 
brute events can insert themselves.’62   
 
Merleau-Ponty is committed to a subjective view of language and meaning, but he denies a 
purely subjective account of the generation of meaning in language just as strongly as he 
distances himself from language as an object, an inert thing.  In his consideration of sign 
and signified relationship in language, the object is not replaced for him by the word.  His 
thesis of the visible and the invisible is applicable here in terms of the sign (the word) as 
visible, and the signified (the concept) as invisible.  For Merleau-Ponty, there will not be 
meaning as “Ideal Truth”.  Our perceptions clothe “presence” and what is 
phenomenologically given to us is received veiled by our perceptions themselves.  ‘He 
who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that he looks at.’63     
 Language has the dynamism of a natural thing, known through its exercise as it 
opens upon things.  ‘Certain elements of the world take on the value of dimensions to 
which from then on we relate all the others and in whose language we express them.’64  
Our own perceptions communicated in speech stylize us to others from the own-ness of the 
body’s perceptual foundation.  In relation to others, we perceive the world a certain way 
and implicit in our perception is a demand made upon others within a certain perceptual 
situation.  The demand is a claim for a confirmation, an objective validation of the truth-
value of our own perceptions.  ‘For the speaking subject, to express is to become aware of; 
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he does not express just for others, but also to know himself what he intends.’65  For 
Merleau-Ponty, there is not a one-to-one correspondence of sign and signified, of thought 
and object.  It is when the sign has become sedimented into a culture’s language that it 
comes to have an experience-related meaning. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, behavior creates 
meaning, but ‘alone of all expressive processes, speaking is able to settle into a sediment 
and constitute an acquisition for inter-subjective use’.66     
The human linguistic intention undertakes the translation of experience into “lived-
reality”.  The relationship between thought, as language-using consciousness, and 
perception, the pre-linguistic objectification of the world, is the study of the nexus of these 
structures of experience (which Husserl termed Fundierung).67  James Edie writes that this 
study took a special form in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, that ‘of a special investigation of the 
relationship of apriori truth to factual or empirical truth’.68  Merleau-Ponty maintained that 
what we know as “real” is what is perceived from a given standpoint.  It is not more real if 
it is true for every intellect:   
‘Before our undivided existence, the world is true: it exists.  The unity, the 
articulations of both are intermingled.  We experience in it a truth which shows 
through and envelops us rather than being held and circumscribed by our 
mind.’69   
 
We perceive the lived-world and articulate it.  We perceive in a pre-reflective silence and 
objectify the world in reflection.  But to found the meaning of the lived-world in mind 
would be to fail to acknowledge that a priori structures are solely structures of this 
                                                 
 65. Ibid., 90. 
 66. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 190. 
 67. James M.Edie, Speaking and Meaning (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 94. 
 68. Ibid. 
 69. Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, 6. 
 36
perceptual space, which is not the only space there is.  It is not, for instance, the space of 
“outer” space.  If man perceives and experiences the space of outer space as being the 
same as the space of the Earth - but with a difference, it is because human reflection 
necessarily refers back to the structures of the lived-world experience of planet Earth.  In 
reflection, space-walkers compare the space-walk experience to the Earth-experience, to 
concepts sedimented over time from within the givenness of Earth.  The light-weighedness 
experienced in the space of zero gravity is named in terms of the absence of an earthly 
feature rather than as a what-it-is of a space alien to man.  We have the language, 
meanings, math, and science only of our particular and inter-subjectively lived-world.  
‘Thus every truth of fact is a truth of reason, and vice versa. …It is therefore of the essence 
of certainty to be established only with reservations…’70  Merleau-Ponty’s view that 
geometric truths are relative values (that is, they can only have a truth-value in the space of 
our particular life-world) is extended by him to possible worlds.  He writes that ‘there is no 
other world possible in the sense in which mine is… because any other world that I might 
try to conceive would set limits to this one, would be found on its boundaries, and would 
consequently merely fuse with it.’71   
Subjectivity for Merleau-Ponty is inherence in a world.  Objectivity is a perspective 
taken, a standpoint from which we perceive.  A priori truth and empirical truth are then two 
facets of the same experience, each founded upon and yet founding the other and neither 
one exclusively “primary” nor “derived”, ‘since it is through the originated that the 
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originator is made manifest’.72  Merleau-Ponty’s interest in linguistics centers around 
Saussure’s move away from an indexical, instrumental view of language in traditional 
linguistics and toward a structural linguistics that Merleau-Ponty adopted in his 
questioning of the genesis of language from within a phenomenological point of view. 
In grounding all meaning in our perception of the lived-world, Merleau-Ponty 
eschews a transcendental sphere of meaning.  He rejects ‘the precept that meaning 
presupposes identification, which, in turn, presupposes subsumption under a concept or 
sign’.73  For him, not all perception is mediated by signs.  Being-in-the-world is our truth.  
‘We can possess a truth, but this experience of truth would be absolute knowledge only if 
we could thematize every motive, that is, if we could cease being in a situation.’74  Instead, 
our perceptions are organized pre-reflectively in the immediacy of the givenness of 
situation.  We perceive phenomena, objects or events, and apply a name to a given 
phenomenon as the accomplishment of thought.  Even the absence of “givenness” is given 
to us in this way.  To imagine ‘Pierre who is not there’, is neither a process of imagining 
Pierre somewhere else nor a reflection of a particular space without Pierre.  The lived-
world is comprehended by us subjunctively, in a mode of possibility open to verification 
by a reality which is independent of the mind. The contingency of the world and the 
limiting of truth and meaning to the givenness of the lived world delivers to our “thin 
autonomy” a layer of creative autonomy.  Man plunges into provisional thought, checks his 
perceptions against what is held to be “real”.  Man works synchronically, in terms of the 
state of the things at the moment, and diachronically, within culture, history, and the 
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physics of the Earth, to confirm, to doubt, to assent, debate and/or deny.  Human 
consciousness projects around man his past, future, the human setting, his physical, 
ideological and moral situation.  Creative autonomy is the invisible core of our humanity 
where, within the din of life, silent choices are ceaselessly made. 
Humans are inseparable from an immersion in the lived-world’s autochthonous 
structure.  We survive and prosper because, as a natural life form, humanity is primordially 
nurtured in this earthly space.  The invisible aspect of man, that which is neither clearly 
mental nor clearly physical, are aspects ascribed to the whole human being through 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of human predicates.  That a distinction can be drawn between 
the mental and the physical presupposes the capacity to use these human predicates.  
Neither purely material nor purely mental, human senses are already “smart” and the body 
moves through, situates and orients itself in the world and gives meaning to that world of 
its own experience.  The body is autochthonously structured in a way which is not merely 
to survive but to organize sensory contents of experience toward a unity of 
meaningfulness.  Edie points out that ‘each child invents for himself the whole structure of 
his maternal tongue on the basis of his own perspectival, restricted experience of it, and 
miraculously, this is just the language which his whole world understands and speaks’.75   
In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty states that language developed without an 
explicit grasp of rules according to which sound and meaning were to be paired.  
Primordially man is able to make use of the body to mean, to express and to understand, 
purposes that transcend the body.  For him, we don’t use words to translate clear and 
distinct interior thought into an external representation of it.  Rather, when we speak we 
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specify our divergence from other views, and those who hear note not simply our “ideas” 
but also our obsessions, our secret history, which is laid bare in the formulation into 
language.  ‘Each is led on by what he said and the response he received, led on by his own 
thoughts of which he is no longer the sole thinker.’76  Language takes form in the lived-
through perceptual contact with the world in which we take up the mute perceptual gesture 
and its visible field in order to articulate experience.  The visual is primary for Merleau-
Ponty, a gestalt-like experience, and language is structured in the way that it is because 
visual experience is structured the way that it is.  
Merleau-Ponty says that the vision and the body are “tangled up in one another”.  
His revision of the reversibility thesis (one hand touching another hand) asserts that there 
is a necessary de-centering that occurs, a standpoint taken, which is essential to perception.  
I see and am seen; I touch and am touched; I can see what I touch and touch what I see.  
And that the world consists of a numberless potential of standpoints from which I am “the 
seen”.  Martin Dillon sees the purpose of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, the section he was 
thinking through at the time of his death, as his ‘continuing effort to free phenomenology 
from its historical confinement within the sphere of immanence by restoring to phenomena 
the transcendence they manifest in the perceptual domain’.77  What we perceive is never 
fully perceived in its entirety whether the object of perception is animate or inanimate.  As 
Dillon says, ‘the phenomenon is the thing we perceive, but we perceive that we do not 
perceive the entirety of its being’.78 Reversibility is conceived by Merleau-Ponty as an 
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interweaving of the visible and the invisible that is constitutive of the phenomenal world.  
He wanted to bridge the span between a subjectivist phenomenology of immanence and a 
reflective philosophy of transcendence.  The transcendence of the world would be restored 
in the sense that I can not experience the “being-seen of myself”.  More importantly, the 
reversibility of the subject-object roles is Merleau-Ponty’s means of overcoming a 
potential charge of dualism in his ontology.  In his view, relationships between self and 
world, self and others, are characterized by a crisscrossing which is at the same time a 
contact and a separation and which he terms chiasm.  In the chiasmic dynamic there is no 
subject/object dichotomy because there is no subjective reflection to objectify the 
unfolding of the Being of beings or to take a position outside of the phenomena in order to 
construct a transparency that isn’t there.  The chiasm, for Merleau-Ponty, is both a 
separation and a reversibility,  
‘If I cannot touch my own movement, this movement is entirely woven out of 
contacts with me- -The touching oneself and the touching have to be 
understood as each the reverse of the other--…the untouchable of the touch, 
the invisible of vision, the unconscious of consciousness …is the other side or 
the reverse (or the other dimensionality) of sensible being…’79   
 
The German-born artist, Oliver Herring, to whom “method of making” is central, 
employed the technique of knitting in his art of the 90’s.  The work that first brought him 
widespread attention, A Flower for Ethyl Eichelberger, was a tribute to the performance 
artist of that name who committed suicide after being diagnosed with AIDS.  Herring said 
that he chose knitting because he wanted a process that ‘would reflect the passage of 
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time’.80  When the work was shown, ‘Herring sat in the shadowy gallery knitting.  His 
presence emphasized Eichelberger’s absence.’81  Herring’s later work included an actual 
figure “knitting himself” because he could seem to be bringing his form into being in a 
continuous stream.  ‘These individual stitches in time can be compared with [the] 
photographic frames that are the integers of film; both stitches and frames remain 
distinguishable, even as they build into a larger whole.’82  Herring’s work, though 
unintentionally so, is a visual explication of Mereau-Ponty’s thesis of chiasm: a method of 
making, the weaving of the visible and the invisible of body, place, and space, which 
creates meaning.   
For Merleau-Ponty, the intersection or crisscrossing between the human body and 
the world is the making of perceptual meaning.  In the system of language, sound, 
meaning, word and thought are interwoven.  There is a chiasm, a separation and a doubling 
back, between the structures of the embodied self and the structures of the linguistic.  In 
Prose of the World, he describes the chiasm as ‘the thread of silence from which the tissue 
of speech is woven’.83 
Merleau-Ponty termed the interrelationship of the visible and the invisible of the 
world “flesh”, his prototype of Being.  For him,  
‘the flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance.  To designate it we would 
need the old term “element”, in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, 
earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the 
spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings 
                                                 
 80. Janet Koplos, “Stitches in Time,” Art in America (New York), Vol. 91, No. 1 (January 2003): 
96-99. 
 81. Ibid., 96. 
 82. Ibid., 97. 
 83. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. John O’Neill 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973), 46.  
 42
a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.  The flesh is in this 
sense an “element” of Being’.84 
 
Flesh denotes everything that may be described phenomenologically, everything that is 
given, everything that is hidden.  The experience of the world is the motivation behind 
Merleau-Ponty’s innovation here.  He argues that we are not “in the world” as though in a 
box.  Where is the seer in the body that is only “shadows stuffed with organs”?  The 
answer for Merleau-Ponty lies in the intertwining of the visible and the invisible, of nature 
and the human body, the human body and perceptual consciousness, and of the natural and 
the cultural.  It is an intertwining because the flesh of the world is a tangled mix of the 
visible and the invisible.  It is chiasmic because visible and invisible are an isomorphic 
reversal of one another.  
 The body, together with the world upon which it opens, sustains a field of stable 
meanings of lived experience.  Language is in a chiasmatic relationship with the body and 
the lived world.  Merleau-Ponty held that ‘It is by considering language that we would best 
see how we are to and how we are not to return to the things themselves’.85  It is through 
the concept of chiasm that Merleau-Ponty escapes traditional dualism, in a unity of the 
human as perceived and perceiving.  By the time of The Visible & the Invisible, he had left 
behind the dualism of a synchronic linguistic of speech and a diachronic linguistics of 
language from his earlier interest in Saussure’s project.  What he continued in until the end 
was his expression of the becoming in which meaning is generated and structured.   
 For Merleau-Ponty, the relationship of sign to signified is not in terms of 
experience or intellectualizing in a strong sense.  He sees the relationship of a sign to 
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another sign as joined to the same degree as the sign’s relation to other signs, which is the 
same as is the relation of the object signified by the sign to other objects.  The sign is 
always a sign in use, always contextual.  For Merleau-Ponty, the meaning is not in the 
sign, the meaning is the sign.  The sign is the perceived perceiving, speech speaking, 
thought thinking.   
 He never discarded the ideas from Saussure that, taken singly, signs do not signify 
and that each sign marks a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs.  The 
meaning of the sign is simultaneous with the knowledge of its differentiation.  
‘The absence of a sign can be a sign, and expression is not the adjustment of an 
element of discourse to each element of meaning, but an operation of language 
upon language which suddenly is thrown out of focus towards its meaning.’86   
 
Meaning emerges from a combination of signs that draw from a real system.  But while 
Saussure speaks about “shapeless masses” of thought and sound, Merleau-Ponty would 
only speak in terms of existents, the perceiver and a system of signs.  Signs are known by 
relation, designation, absence, substitution, figures of speech and metaphor; but it is a 
relationship within what is existentially present to the perceiving subject.  For Merleau-
Ponty, meaning is not given in “sign-present” because meaning is always in the act of 
becoming.  The primordial in man is the event of his enworlding as an opening in a mode 
of perceptual faith.  The event of man is always, for Merleau-Ponty, within the existential 
world which is characterized by an interweaving of the visible and invisible of both man 
and world.  This primordial structure dwells in the sedimented structure, affirming and/or 
amending it.  The sedimented structure is a collection of the bits and pieces of the 
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phenomenal world; but it is nothing other than a sediment without the presence of a 
speaker.  ‘There is no other meaning than carnal, figure and ground.’87 
                                                 





 The focus of this chapter will be to give an account of Derrida’s thinking in the 
areas of perception, Saussurian linguistics, and in the origin and institution of signs.  
Derrida’s critique originated the concept of “differance” as a deconstruction of the 
concepts of structural linguistics and phenomenology.  Derrida uncannily seeks out 
conceptual oppositions in texts and, inverting the binary pair, shows how the deferred 
second term is actually indispensable and constitutively prior to the primary term.  Among 
the binary pairs of interest in this study are the following:  
‘the gram is neither a signifier nor a signified, neither a sign nor a thing, 
neither a presence nor an absence, neither a position nor a negation, etc.; 
spacing is neither space nor time; the incision is neither the incised integrity of 
a beginning, or of a simple cutting into, nor simple secondarity’.88   
 
Derrida’s deconstruction of what he sees as phenomenological philosophy’s attachment to 
a metaphysics of presence-to-meaning and the relationship of that to his view that this 
tradition’s privileges the language of speech over the language of writing will be 
addressed.  
 The trouble begins at once for Merleau-Ponty.  Perception, man’s access to truth for 
Merleau-Ponty, is a reality for Derrida, but it is a reality as a function and not as an origin 
or source.  What Merleau-Ponty conceives as pre-reflective perception is, for Derrida, the 
action that registers before there is meaning.  The action is, of course, not disembodied, 
ergo there is a subject, a center, of the function.  ‘The subject is absolutely indispensable.   
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I don’t destroy the subject; I situate it.’89  The subject is the originator of a movement 
which is not an intentionality for Derrida.  To be the source of an “intention” would 
implicitly be to seek a certain outcome in terms of a move in the direction of a meaning, 
and “meaning” is an ideality to Derrida.  In what sense does he assert that meaning is an 
ideality?  It is in the sense of permanence, but it is a permanence based upon repetition.  In 
Derrida’s view, language doesn’t “mean” something: language refers only to itself.  When 
we use language, we work from within a repeatable system.  Husserl gives us the motives:   
‘A sign which would take place but “once” would not be a sign. …It must 
remain the same, and be able to be repeated as such, despite and across the 
deformations which the empirical event necessarily makes it undergo.  …But, 
it can function as a sign, and in general as a language, only if a formal identity 
enables it to be issued again and to be recognized.  This identity is necessarily 
ideal.’90 
 
Derrida will say that what Husserl has called “preexpressive” sounds to him like a 
layer of pure meaning, or pure signified, that a signifing intentionality could tap, bring to 
light, and express.  For Derrida, the intentionality/perceptual-intuitiveness dynamic leaves 
the relationship of signified (concept) and signifier (sound-image, word) as one of 
exteriority.  Perception entails exteriority to Derrida.  Implicit in the notion of standpoint is 
a perspective taken within a structured whole which, to him, is the problem of presence as 
origin within a linear, diachronic view of language unfolding in time.  Linearity is 
‘associated with logocentrism, phonocentrism, semantism, and idealism.91, which locates 
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meaning, according to Derrida’s critique, in the abiding functions and structures of the 
external world.    
 The crux of the error that Derrida assigns to Husserlian phenomenology is in its 
privileging of “presence to meaning”.  In his view, Husserl’s hypothesis of solitary 
discourse is a pure ideality, pre-sent as an origin, a living present which, in itself, becomes 
available for infinite repeatability.  This is phenomenology’s principle of principles in 
Derrida’s view.  He asks:   
‘What does the value of primordial presence to intuition as source of sense and 
evidence, as the a priori of aprioris, signify?  First of all it signifies the 
certainty, itself ideal and absolute, that the universal form of all experience 
(Erlebnis), and therefore of all life, has always been and will always be the 
present.  The present alone is and ever will be.  Being is presence or the 
modification of presence’.92   
 
In opposition to this emphasis on a presence to meaning, Derrida holds that there is no 
meaning conceivable outside and before the operations of differing and deferring 
(differance) in the process or system of signification.  His view is that Husserl wanted a 
“purity” of expression within a solitary mental life, in an immediacy of self-present 
consciousness.  Central to Derrida’s critique of Husserl is the argument that an immediacy 
of self-present experience or perception would be empty in the absence of any 
representation or signification of what is non-present.  What could be a pre-linguistic, pre-
semiotic, pre-expressive thought?  This problem prompts Derrida to state that ‘In a certain 
sense,“thought” means nothing.’93  The signified is always-already signifying and is not 
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secondary or derivative.  Derrida’s formulates his concept of arche-writing to overcome 
what he sees as the priority given to speech as “presence-to-meaning”.   
 Derrida asserts that because the voice as “immediacy” is the sole case to escape the 
distinction between what is worldly and what is transcendental, making that distinction 
possible in our understanding, we place a higher value on speech than on writing.  ‘To 
speak to someone doubtless is to hear oneself speak, to be heard by oneself; but, at the 
same time, if one is heard by another, to speak is to make him repeat immediately in 
himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the very form I effectuated it.  This immediate 
repetition is a reproduction of pure auto-affection without the help of anything external’94  
The experience of a self-proximity is an absolute reduction of space in general to the trace 
of an exterior in the interior space in which our experience or our image of our own body is 
spread forth.   
The proximity is broken when I see myself write rather than hear myself speak.  So 
in the natural attitude, the “immediacy” of speech is recognized as the privileged medium 
of human discourse.  Derrida’s view is that all material substances of speech, both sound 
and inscription, are secondary to the “immaterial substance” of content.  Content lies in the 
play of differance in expressions of “meaning” in any context, including the inner 
dialogue, speech, inscription, gesture, art, etc.  The content is not an ineffable presence in 
the noumena, nor is it a self-contained exterior system.  It is arche-writing, a very subtle 
Derridian concept that George Free describes as ‘an operation that is constitutive of 
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language in its ideality and, at the same time, that is irreducible to the concept of linguistic 
form’.95 
Arche-writing appears as a process in the forming of human thought.  Saussure’s 
arbitrary connection between sign and meaning occurs in a blank space, a spacing that ‘is 
always the unperceived, the nonpresent, and the nonconscious’96, to Derrida.  Arche-
writing is the dead time at work, in the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of 
space in human consciousness, in the birth of signification.  Arche-writing is inscribed as a 
“sensible” and “spatial” element that is detected as “exterior”.  Non-presence of what is 
“other” is then the very possibility of an objective outside which, because it is so intimate 
to us, leaves only a trace, the arche-memory of differance.  Derrida links Saussure’s 
standard form in writing (23) to the point he wants to make: that it is the spacing of words 
and sounds, the structure of language, that makes language meaningful.  As in Saussure’s 
structuralist formulation, the signs used in writing are arbitrary, and the value of letters is 
purely negative and differential. 
Derrida parts with Saussure in the privileging of speech-as-presence over writing-
as-derivative and secondary.  Where tradition wants a secondary or derivative status for the 
particularity of “language as writing”, Derrida insists that, if applied at all, this 
“secondarity” can’t be ascribed to writing alone; it affects all signifieds in general, affects 
them always already, the moment they enter the game.  There is not a single signified that 
can escape or that can be independently derived outside of the play of signifying references 
                                                 
 95. George Free, “Language, Speech and Writing: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Saussure” Human 
Studies 13 (1990) 293-06, 303. 
 96. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 68. 
 50
that constitute language.  Meaning is the representative structure of repetition, signification 
itself for Derrida.  A formal identity allows itself to be recognized as the same.   
Derrida’s view is that Saussure saw the “expressive value” of a “signifier” only in 
the form of the “sound image”.  Derrida explains, ‘Signifier means sound-image.  But not 
taking the “phenomenological” precaution, Saussure makes the sound image, the signifier 
as “mental impression,” into a reality whose sole originality is to be internal…’.97  Derrida 
argues that the sound-image is then held as primary while writing will be “phonetic”, the 
exterior representation of language and of the “thought-sound”.  Derrida maintains that 
there is such a thing as an “action that registers before meaning” but it isn’t an intuitive 
knowing that is expressed in speech as an originary self-givenness of a meaning itself 
instituting a sign.  Such a “knowing”, to Derrida, would be to ‘suppose[s] that prior to 
signs and outside them, and excluding every trace and differance, something such as 
consciousness is possible.  It supposes, moreover, that, even before the distribution of signs 
in space and in the world, consciousness can gather itself up in its own presence’.98  
In Derrida’s view, there is a coherent connection between signs in speech and signs 
in writing as both are founded upon a phonemic basis.  The phoneme is the speech sound.  
But, in itself, the phoneme can’t be spoken; rather, it is what makes speech possible.  
Phonemes are the component parts of the word-unit which, for Derrida, means the aspects 
of differance within a given sound.  Saussure and Derrida would agree that changing a 
phoneme doesn’t change the word, and that the material element, sound alone, does not 
“belong” to language but is only a substance put to use.  But for Derrida, Saussure’s 
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“arbitrariness” in the connection between language as thought and language as speech 
applies just as unconditionally to the connection between speech and writing.  In our 
earlier discussion of the multiplicity of languages (words for “horse”), we established that 
the connection between sound and meaning is arbitrary.  Derrida’s point here is that the 
connection between sound and inscription is equally arbitrary and, against Saussure, that 
writing is not the derivative image and copy of speech.  
Saussure places all material substances of linguistic expression (sound, writing) in a 
“secondary” category, yet spoken speech has special status: 
First, the graphic form of words strikes us as being something permanent and 
stable, better suited than sound to account for the unity of language throughout 
time.  Though it creates a purely fictitious unity, the superficial bond of writing 
is much easier to grasp than the only true bond, the bond of sound.’99 
 
Derrida’s view is that Saussure could see but could not understand that a certain model of 
writing is necessary, provisionally imposed, as an instrument and technique of 
representation of the concepts of a language system.  Rather than understanding writing as 
that which permits the thinking, within language, of concepts like those of the sign, 
technique, representation, and language, Saussure wanted to bracket writing away from 
what he views as a closed, internal sphere of play of phonemes, characterized not by their 
particular qualities but by their distinctness in relation to the other elements of the system.   
Derrida writes, ‘it is the theoretician of the arbitrariness of the sign who reminds us…’ that 
there is a recoverable, simple and original natural order of relationships between speech 
and writing, that is, between an inside and an outside.100  In thinking through the 
relationship between speech and writing, Saussure does so within the context of a 
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natural/instituted opposition and privileges the allegedly natural relationship (a stable oral 
tradition) between voice and sense, between the order of phonic signifiers and their 
content, their signification.  The “interior” is natural: the “exterior” instituted.  Writing as 
the exterior presents ‘annoying consequences’ to Saussure.  The problem is both that, in 
his view, language is always evolving, while writing remains stable; and that spelling lags 
behind pronunciation.  The consequence of this is: ‘writing obscures language; it is not a 
guise for language but a disguise’.101    
For Derrida, intersubjectivity, the site of expression and indication, is the openness 
of the present upon an outside of itself in an unfolding in time.  This being outside of itself 
is a spacing in which the relation of one present to another is a non-derived re-presentation.  
Presence ‘to another present as such produces the structure of signs in general as 
“reference,” as being-for-something, and radically precludes their reduction’.102  Once we 
move from the “hearing-oneself-speak” of the interior monologue to the openness upon 
exteriority, of what is not “one’s own”, we have opened upon a spacing.   
‘As soon as we admit both spacing as “interval” or difference and as openness 
upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside… Hearing oneself 
speak is not the inwardness of an inside that is closed in upon itself; it is the 
irreducible openness on the inside; it is the eye and the world within speech…. 
And if indication –for example, writing in the everyday sense –must 
necessarily be “added” to speech to complete the constitution of the ideal 
object, if speech must be “added” to the thought identity of the object, it is 
because the “presence” of sense and speech had already from the start fallen 
short of itself.’103   
 
Derrida holds that the presumed interiority of meaning is already worked upon by its own 
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exteriority.  It is always carried outside itself.  It already differs (from self) before any act 
of expression in the concept of arche-writing. 
‘Freeplay is the disruption of presence’104 for Derrida.  “Thought means nothing” 
means thought is the operator within the field of freeplay.  Thought does not derive from 
meaning but operates within a structure of repetition in which a signifier becomes 
recognizable.  For Derrida, the presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition and not 
the reverse.  
‘Freeplay is always as interplay of absence and presence, but if it is to be 
radically perceived, freeplay must be conceived of before the alternative of 
presence and absence; being must be conceived of as presence and absence 
beginning with the possibility of freeplay and not the other way around.’105 
 
Differance is never a sensible surplus nor is it a negative value.  Differance plays within 
presence and absence.   
To Derrida, it is the meaning, the sense of a thought, that is at issue and his view is 
that both writing and speech are natural in the same way and instituted in the same way. 
The units of the system have to be analyzed from within the whole, which means much 
more than an adding together of word-units and uniting sounds and concepts.  The field of 
freeplay is a field of infinite substitution; infinite within the closure of a finite collectivity.  
The field permits infinite substitution because:  
‘there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and founds the 
freeplay of substitution. …the absence of a center or origin, is the movement of 
supplementarity.  One cannot determine the center, the sign which supplements 
it, which takes its place in its absence- because this sign adds itself, occurs in 
addition, over and above, comes as a supplement.  The movement of 
signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always 
                                                 
             104. Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play, 263. 
             105. Ibid., 264-65.  
 54
more, but this addition is a floating one because it comes to perform a 
vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of the signified.’106 
 
The text is the isomorphism of Derrida’s vision of the field of freeplay.  In the text, there is 
no center, no presence.  Composed of visual signifiers, it is external rather than purely 
formal and internal.  For Derrida, once a written image is applied to the spoken word, the 
identity of the word is altered, ‘the point of origin becomes ungraspable’.107  The sound 
plus sign constitutes a new identity which seems original, a what-it-is.  The spoken word 
then loses its power, its primacy as “original” in the sense of a unity prior to sensible 
representation.  According to Derrida, ‘the phonic element, the term, the plentitude that is 
called sensible, would not appear without the differance or opposition which gives them 
form’.  Differance is the formation of form which ‘presupposes an originary synthesis not 
preceded by any absolute simplicity’.108  A science of differance would be a science of 
non-origin, and an impossibility.  Derrida has taken the science of linguistics and in a 
classic deconstructionist inversion appropriated questions of language and meaning and 
reframed them as philosophical themes in the sense that they are re-posited as “open to 
question”.  
 Textuality is not a “new idealism” for Derrida, not “the last word”.  The new 
identity that an originality of expression in a text sets in motion entails a deconstruction to 
deny a graphocentrism of the word as presence. The case of the “title” is an example  
Derrida takes: The title, 
 
‘which –like the head or capital, or the oracle –carries its head high, speaks in 
too high a voice, both because it raises its voice and drowns out the ensuing 
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text, and because it is found high up on the page, the top of the page becoming 
the eminent center, the beginning, the command station, the chief, the archon.’ 
…To suspend the title, then is necessary, considering what the title dominates.  
But the function of the title is not one merely of hierarchy.  The title to 
suspend, is also, by virtue of its place, suspended…  Up above the text from 
which it expects and receives all –or nothing’.109 
 
Spoken language already belongs to writing, in Derrida’s view; but what remains now is to 
demystify writing, inscription.  The play of differance in textual signification carries within 
it the possibility of its own erasure since writing too is structured by differance.  Derrida 
wants to deconstruct the assumption of “center” in the text, a central meaning which would 
be another false appearance of a present as presence.  He signifies this absence with the use 
of crossed lines over words to mark the placing of a formal “essence” of meaning under 
erasure.  Inscription, like speech, is open to being thought under erasure because, for 





                                                 








 Structuralism was a movement of thought that wanted to understand cultural 
phenomena through an intellectual reconstruction of interconnectedness and relationships, 
rather than through a study of isolated material things in themselves.  While anthropology 
and linguistics may consider structure as a “real” existent, phenomenological philosophy has 
employed structuralism as a template to assist in its descriptions of lived experience.  An 
understanding of the internal, invisible structures would not be the same as the breaking 
down into smaller particles to be isolated and studied as in science.  Rather the approach 
toward structuralism in philosophy was prompted by a conviction that observable patterns 
can be valuable in informing a sense of the whole. 
 For both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, all structuralism is a structuralism of the lived 
world.  It is the patterns of the phenomenal world that are examined.  The key sub-headings 
in this thesis are the status of concepts of time and space, and the role played by particular 
concepts in the structuralism of Saussurian linguistics.  Where do Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Derrida’s views coalesce and where do they diverge? 
 Merleau-Ponty saw time as an instituted system of equivalences; that is, time is 
always seen from the standpoint of one who is in it.  Time constitutes itself and yet, 
paradoxically, time is only time as a perceptual event of man.  For Merleau-Ponty, the 
contradiction is lifted because every new present is itself transcendental.  What is distant 
gives itself and yet man knows that it is not there but that it was just there; we never 
coincide with the present.  Time, in his analysis, and particularly in the pages of The Visible 
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and the Invisible, ‘is a cycle defined by a central and dominant region and with indecisive 
contours –a swelling or bulb of time.’110 
 Derrida’s focus regarding the question of time is upon a deconstruction of the 
concept of “presence-to-meaning”.  Derrida situates a subject before any discussion can 
ensue.  While not precisely the same, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of perceptual faith, and 
Derrida’s “action that registers before there is meaning” share some attributes.  The 
Merleau-Ponty of the 1940s to late 1950s is thought to have endorsed idealism’s notion of 
presence, as indicated in a passage which Nancy Holland quotes in an article (1992) on the 
subject:  ‘But the present …nevertheless enjoys a privilege because it is the zone in which 
being and consciousness coincide.’111  However, in Holland’s conversation with Derrida, 
she reports that he ‘made it clear that… with The Visible and the Invisible it is even harder 
to say.’ that Merleau-Ponty’s work would fall within a metaphysics of presence.112 
 This position, that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is not contained within a 
metaphysics of presence-to-meaning, is what I would argue for here.  Crucial to this reading 
of Merleau-Ponty is a revision in the understanding of just what “perception” is for him.  
Perception is the role of the body in experience and perception is always pre-reflective for 
Merleau-Ponty.  As Holland argues, there is never a “pure” perception for Merleau-Ponty, 
‘but rather an indeterminate, immanent experience’.113  In The Visible and the Invisible,  
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Merleau-Ponty writes: 
‘We are interrogating our experience precisely in order to know how it opens us 
to what is not ourselves.  This does not even exclude the possibility that we find 
in our experience a movement toward what could not in any event be present to 
us in the original and whose irremediable absence would thus count among our 
originating experiences.  But, if only in order to see these margins of presence, 
to discern theses references, to put them to the test, or to interrogate them, we do 
indeed first have to fix our gaze on what is apparently given to us.114  
 
In much of our experience, we proceed pre-reflectively in a mode of, what Merleau-Ponty 
calls, non-positing consciousness.  In reflection, we can check our watch, catch our bearings 
and take note of our perspective, the standpoint from which non-positing consciousness is 
engaged in a world.  Merleau-Ponty looks upon reflection as the ordering of a synopsis 
where experience is digested, a summing-up of what the embodied subject is doing in a 
recognition of a “here at the moment in the work I am”.  For Merleau-Ponty, such a synopsis 
is not at all the production of a synthesis by a mind and a body.  Reflection is not the 
combining of what has been separate, but a summing up of a past embodied experience.  
Thought is our embodied experience of the world.  As Holland notes, it is exactly the body’s 
experience of the world that creates the “irremediable absence” because, unlike the ego, the 
body has a perspective on the world.  There is always flesh, ground, figure.  Reflection is the 
way in which, for Merleau-Ponty, the full significance of perceptions is grasped in a 
dynamic which does not fall into the margins of a theory of presence-to-meaning.  Holland’s 
view is that Derrida’s objection to “perception”115  might be read ‘as a recognition that 
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perception in the usual sense is an intellectual recreation of what is in fact a bodily 
consciousness not available to the transcendental ego as such’.116 
 Both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida want to avoid the traditional dualisms.  In Merleau-
Ponty we find a “situatedness” through which meaning emerges as the very process of 
embodiment.  Man’s embodiment is not thought in terms of the attributes of an object, a 
body becoming animate; instead, man’s embodiment is that of a situated non-positing 
consciousness, present to the irremediable absence of the pre-reflective perception.  The 
truth value of the reflection then becomes secondary to an immediacy of a knowing 
perception to which he has no access.  What is had is the certainty of a past the truth value of 
which seems greater than an intellectual reflection upon it can reveal.  Holland’s argument is 
that Merleau-Ponty’s non-positing consciousness is a primordial bodily experience 
underling the non-primordial, intellectually reconstructed perception of positing 
consciousness.  But crucial to aligning Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, as we seek to do here, is 
to understand that for Merleau-Ponty it is a mere sketch or fragment of meaning within an 
autochthonously structured whole that calls forth a repetition within man whereby meaning 
is created.  Holland asserts that, ‘[A]ll of these concepts –truth, consciousness, perception –
are removed from their usual metaphysical significations in Merleau-Ponty –by his reliance 
on the necessary absence introduced by our body and our situatedness in the world’.117  It is 
our situatedness in the world that enables our reflection upon a past present and gives a 
sense of past and future as parts of a bodily life.        
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Derrida’s view on “time” is revealed by his examination of language’s structure.  The 
tense marker and the predicate, the ways in which we construct sentences and speak, reveal 
our distance from “presence”.  We don’t express experience in terms of “I am being 
appeared to red-ly”, or “red-ing is” because, as Derrida observes in his critique of 
Phenomenology, ‘…the thing itself always escapes’.118  Merleau-Ponty concurs because, for 
him, what is perceived is always seen against a background, and, thus, more is invisible than 
is visible in any single perspective.  As early as the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty wrote,  
 ‘Hence reflection does not itself grasp its full significance unless it refers to the 
unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and 
which constitutes for it a kind of original past, a past which has never been 
present.’119   
 
Compare to Derrida: 
‘The trace is not only the disappearance of origin  –within the discourse that we 
sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not 
even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, 
the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin.  From then on, …one 
must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche-trace.’120 
 
The closeness of their positions is further noted in the descriptions each has given of man’s 
experience of time.  From Merleau-Ponty:   
‘But if the for-itself, the revelation of self to self is merely the hollow in which 
time is formed, and if the world “in-itself” is simply the horizon of my present, 
then the problem is reduced to the form: How is it that a being which is still to 
come and has passed by, also has a present –which means that the problem is 
eliminated, since the future, the past, and the present are linked together in the 
process of temporalization.’121 
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And from Derrida: 
‘Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent and the becoming-unconscious of 
the subject.  By the movement of its drift/derivation the emancipation of the sign 
constitutes in return the desire for presence. …this becoming is the constitution 
of subjectivity.  …Within the horizontality of spacing, …it is not even necessary 
to say that spacing cuts, drops or causes to drop within the unconscious: the 
unconscious is nothing without this cadence and before this caesura.  This 
signification is formed only within the hollow of differance: of discontinuity and 
of discreteness, of the diversion and the reserve of what does not appear.’122  
 
All being is a “becoming” in the thought of both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida; and the 
“becoming of meaning” occurs for both in a hollow, a gentler version of the abyss, that lies 
nowhere, but that is a “between” of presence and non-presence.  This occurs for Merleau-
Ponty in the lived interaction between perceiver and world; and for Derrida in the space of 
differance.  In and through language, the ties that bind man and world are constituted in 
order to illuminate what shows itself as it shows itself.  
 From the concepts of the linguistic structuralism of Saussure that Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida adapted for their own thoughts about language, we will concentrate here on only 
two.  First, the concept of language as a sedimented system; and, secondly, the concept of 
language as a structure of reference. 
Merleau-Ponty viewed all experience as grounded in a sedimented system, beginning 
with the primal fact that we find ourselves in a world which seems always-already structured 
to support our projects.  The amazing fact that babies learn the language of their mother 
tongue, with all its complexities, points to the concept of a sedimented world for him.  The 
sedimented structure of the world would be defined as “relational” rather than substantial in 
his view.  The sedimentation is material only in the sense that we are upright with opposed 
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thumb, etc., with a mode or style of being that is a questioning attunement to the world.  
Every encounter is a new sedimentation in the structuring of a world.  What follows from 
this, in my view, is that every subsequent encounter is always on the basis of a sedimented 
structure as in the sense of “trace” in Derrida.  Our subjectivity is founded on our facticity, 
in that I, alone, see with these eyes, see from this height, and reflect the context of a past, 
immediate or durational, that is uniquely mine.  Only I dwell on the hither side of my skin 
where my embodied experience remains as a sedimented trace.   
Derrida does not take up Saussure’s sedimentation concept and, in fact, he 
particularly decries against the use of that metaphor in his writing about Husserl’s “noetic-
noematic stratum”.  He writes, 
‘The interweaving (Verwebung) of language, of what is purely linguistic in 
language with the other threads of experience, constitutes one fabric. The term 
Verwebung refers to this metaphorical zone.  The strata are woven; their 
intermixing is such that the warp cannot be distinguished from the woof.  If the 
stratum of logos were simply founded, one could set it aside so as to let the 
underlying substratum of nonexpressive acts and contents appear beneath it.  But 
since this superstructure reacts in an essential and decisive way upon the 
Unterschicht [substratum], one is obliged to associate the geological metaphor 
with a properly textual metaphor, for the fabric or textile means text.  …In the 
spinning-out of language the discursive woof is rendered unrecognizable as a 
woof and takes the place of a warp; it takes the place of something that has not 
preceded it.123 
 
For Derrida, an analysis of textuality will never found the “ground” that he believes Husserl  
wanted.  The texture of the text is irreducible to Derrida and the constitution of signification 
originates as non-origin in the weave of text.  
  The concept Derrida does appropriate from Saussure is the differential structure in 
linguistics.  Meaning for Derrida is constituted by the operations of differing and deferring.  
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Content is arche-writing.  Meaning is inscribed in a weave of interior and exterior, as what is 
“situated” becomes entwined with what is other, different, differed.  The primacy of the text 
for Derrida should then not be separated from its Latin origins and the “weaving” metaphor.  
The text is any medium for Derrida: verbal, non-verbal, writing, audio, video; and is held by 
him always to be physically independent of sender or receiver.  Thought operates within a 
textured whole of repetition without origin from which the only “meaning” there can be is 
derived. George Free asserts that ‘language is understood here as the process of 
systematization, of idealization –a process that works constantly to separate that which is 
internal from that which is external’.124  That process by which language works to articulate 
the hollow of the irremediable absence which differs and defers is the process of an 
articulation of the unity of the internal and the external. 
 In Merleau-Ponty’s final work, The Visible and the Invisible, and in Derrida’s 
thoughts about language in Of Grammatology and Speech and Phenomena, I find common 
ground in their conceptions of the founding of time and space in the deferred-present.  There 
is an irremediable absence that reflection marks as a difference setting in motion the passage 
of the a priori of a silent hollow into language.  For both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, 
meaning is posited by consciousness in a process of repetition in which thought serves to 
confirm an initial pre-reflective perception.  Derrida’s ‘action that registers before there is a 
meaning’ and Merleau-Ponty’s pre-reflective perception lay the basis for language to 
express the unity of experience, not in the making of sounds or marks but in thinking.  For 
Derrida, there is no pre-cognition of a Kantian predicate but of a signifier, the trace as arche-
writing.  For Merleau-Ponty, meaning is the process of our embodiment in an already 
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autochthonously ordered world that is structured to permit our perception, and that is not a 
chaos which our mind must order and unify.       
In his later work, Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis was directed toward the interwoven 
interior-exterior in his concept of the “flesh” of the world (an elemental building block such 
as fire and water) and chiasm (a totalizing of the reflexivity of man and world), and away 
from the concepts of perception and sedimentation.  Glen Mazis expresses the direction that 
Merleau-Ponty was taking as the idea that, ‘the degree of meaning and vitality that 
something adds to our existence and our understanding might be the more appropriate 
standard of what is real…’125  Derrida wants a concept of writing that is no longer the simple 
notation of words.  A writing to cover the entire range of phonetic writing, speech, 
hieroglyphics, the visual, pictorial and the plastic - where logic cannot be used to ensure a 
seemingly “rational transparency”- and where the concepts of logic and objectivity that have 
been employed to assure the transparency and grounding of thought, are removed and we 
‘lay bare the flesh of the word’.126  Derrida presses man to examine his linguistics concepts 
and give up living in them blindly.  Merleau-Ponty thought that an involved embodiment in 
the world that looks for meaning not simply in words and concepts but in behavioral and 
experiential facts as well, would overcome the double error of thinking experience against a 
ground of nothingness, or thinking nothingness against a ground of experience.   
‘If I pretend to find, through reflection, in the universal mind the premise that 
had always backed up my experience, I can do so only by forgetting this non-
knowing of a beginning which is not nothing, and which is not the reflective 
truth either, and which also must be accounted for.  I was able to make an appeal 
from the world and the others to myself and take the route of reflection, only 
because first I was outside of myself, in the world, among the others, and 
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constantly this experience feeds my reflection.  Such is the total situation that a 
philosophy must account for.’127 
 
The reliance upon successful problem-solving and successful patterns of behavior for truth-
value overlooks the truth we lack, that which constitutes our being and the being of the 
world in which we live.  As always only perspectively given, there is an inherent falsity in 
meaning for us that cannot be overcome.  The solution is not to deny our situatedness but to 
take into account reflection’s proclivity to inevitably distort its subject matter.  Our truth is 
always perspectival; we ourselves are truth’s veil.   
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